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GENERALIZED CASH FLOW TAXATION
Abstract
We show the unique form that must be taken by a tax system based
entirely on realization accounting to implement a uniform capital
income tax, or, equivalently, a uniform wealth tax. This system
combines elements of an accrual based capital income tax and a
traditional cash flow tax, having many of the attributes of the latter
while still imposing a tax burden on marginal capital income. Like the
traditional cash flow tax, this system may be integrated with a tax on
labor income. We also show how such a tax can be supplemented
with an optional accounting for a segregated subset of actively
traded securities, subjected separately to mark-to-market taxation at
the uniform capital income tax rate, to permit a fully graduated tax
system applicable to labor income.
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The growing flexibility of financial arrangements has wreaked havoc on the income tax.
The problems arise in connection with the treatment of financial and business transactions
generally lumped under the heading of “capital income.”  Transactions with similar economic
effect face tax rules that differ with respect to the timing and the rate of taxation, essentially
providing taxpayers with the opportunity to elect the most favorable tax treatment for any
particular asset.  This inconsistency also facilitates the construction of offsetting arbitrage
positions that involve little net economic activity but that can be used to reduce tax liability on
income from other, unrelated sources.  The dysfunctional consequences appear in various guises,
including the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains, the deferral of capital gains by
individuals, and the recently publicized aggressive pursuit of tax shelters by corporations.
Traditionally, the policy response to such behavior has been to attempt to limit taxpayers’
ability to engage in transactions, to throw sand in the gears of financial innovation aimed
primarily at tax avoidance.  Such a response is, however, inevitably imperfect, for there is no
single correct way to preserve a tax system that treats similar transactions inconsistently.
Provisions aimed at curtailing “abuses” may also catch taxpayers happening to choose a similar
pattern of transactions, wherever the line is drawn to identify transactions without economic
substance.  Ultimately, the problem will exist unless all types of income are subject to the same
present value tax burden, at least ex ante at the time decisions are made.
Directly imposing the same rate of tax on all income as it accrues requires a tax system
that marks assets to market, a process that is straightforward for frequently traded assets but quite
difficult for others.  Indeed, with the rise in derivatives and synthetic assets, it is not even clear
where to draw the boundaries separating one asset from another for purposes of valuing and2
taxing each.  An alternative response is to ignore financial transactions entirely, or to impose a
cash flow tax on capital income.  As various authors have shown, imposing a tax at a constant
rate on all positive and negative cash flows still imposes a zero effective tax rate at the margin on
the normal, risk-free return to capital income from new investment.  But a shift to cash flow
taxation differs from elimination of capital income taxes with respect to timing and in taxing
economic rents and, depending on transition rules, returns to existing assets as well.  A
frequently cited advantage of cash flow taxation is that it can collect revenue from capital
income sources (i.e., rents, such as the rewards to entrepreneurship and the supernormal return
on investment, and, in the case of a transition from a different regime, old capital) without
having to measure capital income.  However, perhaps because it is poorly understood, or perhaps
because policy makers are committed to the attempt to include the risk-free return to wealth in
the tax base, the cash flow tax has not been adopted as an alternative to the income tax.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to generalize cash flow taxation in a manner that
preserves this major advantage – not having to measure capital income – while at the same time
effectively imposing an income tax at a constant rate on all capital income.  This approach, to
which we refer as generalized cash flow taxation, resembles cash flow taxation in that it taxes
only cash flows and is not based on any measurement of income.  However, unlike simple cash
flow taxation, the tax assessment levied on any particular cash flow depends on that cash flow’s
date and the effective capital income tax rate that the government wishes to impose.  As we
show, such a tax system is equivalent, ex ante, from the viewpoint of both investor and
government to a pure accrual tax at the same rate.  It replaces the requirement of asset valuation
(which may not be feasible) with the assumption of an efficient capital market in which
investors’ equate the certainty-equivalent after-tax returns on different assets.3
2. Generalized Cash Flow Taxation
Our approach represents an extension of two previous papers, Auerbach (1991) and
Bradford (1997), and may be most easily understood by starting with a brief review of the results
of these two papers, with the results recast in discrete time for clarity and mathematical
simplicity.  As in each of these papers, we start with the most basic of investor decisions,
whether or not to sell (and therefore realize the income from) an asset that generates no
intermediate cash flows between purchase and the moment of sale.  The class of transactions
considered at the outset consists of arms length purchase, sale, and holding of financial assets
traded in active public markets.  Later we extend the scope to consider assets such as closely held
businesses.
A. Derivation of the generalized cash flow tax rule
Under a typical capital gains tax system with a constant tax rate, realization (of positive
gain) is discouraged – the investor is “locked in” – because there is a deferral advantage to
delaying, without interest, the taxation of gains.  Put another way, the investor is willing to
accept a lower before-tax rate of return on the asset than is available on other assets, because the
tax on additional returns is effectively reduced by the eroded tax liability on gains already
accrued.
This deferral advantage could be offset, and the additional returns on current and
alternative assets subjected to uniform treatment, by charging (deductible) interest on unpaid
taxes as gains accrued, as first envisioned by Vickrey (1939), with the tax liability at realization,
T, evolving according to the expression
(1) s s s s A tr T t i T + - + = + )] 1 ( 1 [ 1 ,4
where As is the value of the asset at date s (with time measured from the acquisition date), i is the
safe rate of interest, t is the income tax rate, and rs is the asset’s rate of appreciation between
dates s and s+1.  Unfortunately, implementation of the unique tax system based on (1) and the
initial condition T0 = 0 would require that we observe the path of As over time, i.e., the value of rs
at each date.
However, following Auerbach (1991), we observe that Vickrey’s approach is
unnecessarily restrictive if the objective is to eliminate the lock-in effect the investor faces at
each date s.  As shown in Appendix A, the condition
(2) s s s tiA T t i T V + - + = + )] 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 1 ,
where the operator V(·) converts a date’s uncertain returns into their certainty equivalents, is
necessary and sufficient for an asset held from date s to date s+1 to yield a before-tax return
equal in certainty-equivalence to the before-tax interest rate.  This is equivalent to the
prospective gains on the asset facing an effective tax rate of t.  Vickrey’s system obeys (2),
because in portfolio equilibrium the certainty-equivalent before-tax return on any risky asset
equals the safe rate of return when assets are taxed uniformly, i.e.,  i r V s = ) ( .  But if we
decompose the risky asset’s return into two components, the safe return plus the excess return,
then any tax system that imposes a tax rate t on the safe return will satisfy (2).  That is, a
sufficient condition for (2) is that the tax liability T evolve according to
(3) s s s s s A i r t tiA T t i T ) ( )] 1 ( 1 [
*
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where t
* is an arbitrary constant, because applying the operator V(·) to (3) eliminates the last term
on the right-hand side of the expression.  One can choose any value for t
*, and need not set t
* = t.5
The underlying reason for this flexibility with respect to the choice of t* is that investors
can offset changes in pure risk-sharing (i.e., variations in the tax rate on the excess return) with
portfolio shifts between safe and risky assets (see, e.g., Sandmo 1985).  Thus, an investor will
not simply be indifferent, ex ante, with respect to the choice of t*, but also in an equal position ex
post, when the investor’s entire portfolio is considered.  Further, should the private sector’s risk-
pooling be efficient, this variation in tax collections will also have no effect on the resulting
equilibrium, once account is taken of the impact of the risk characteristics of government
revenues (Gordon 1985, Konrad 1991, Kaplow 1994).
Replacing condition (1) with condition (3) does not directly indicate a solution to the
problem of not being able to observe the path of As.  However, a widened set of admissible tax
structures might include some that do not require this information.  Indeed, this turns out to be
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Under (4), the tax liability upon realization at date s is independent not only of the evolution of A
over time, but also of the initial purchase price.  The tax Ts depends only on the amount realized,
As, the realization date, s (which we can interpret as the holding period), the safe interest rate, i,
                                                
1 As period length declines, this expression approaches the continuous time version,  s
its
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in Auerbach (1991).  Similar limiting expressions apply for other formulas derived below.6
and the income tax rate, t.
2  The liability in (4) is what would result if one assumed that the
observed sale proceeds As had resulted from accumulation at the safe rate from date 0 onward,
and then imposed Vickrey’s system on the assumed pattern of gains, starting with the imputed
date-0 value,  . ) 1 ( s
s A i
- +
In Appendix A, we restate two other proofs based on the presentation in Auerbach.  First,
the expression in (4) is unique among tax regimes that (i) depend only on the same information
set (notably, not on asset values at any other date) and (ii) impose no tax liability upon
realizations at date 0.  Second, the final realization decision would still be undistorted by taxation
for assets with intermediate distributions, if each distribution were also subject to taxation based
on (4).  This result will turn out to be important for our current investigation, because it paves the
way for aggregating different assets under the same tax regime, not requiring that we identify the
sources of distributions as long as they face a particular predetermined tax formula.
Bradford (1997) asked whether one could implement a more general tax system than the
one described in (4) and yet still satisfy the requirement of holding-period neutrality.  He found,
indeed, that this was possible.  Considering again the simple case of an investment at date 0 with
a realization at date s and no intermediate cash flows, Bradford proposed the following tax
regime.  Let D be the gains realization date and g be the gains tax rate.  For the sake of intuition,
imagine that 0 £ D £ s, although this does not affect the algebra.  The tax liability at date s is
computed in two steps.  First, we calculate an imputed gain at date D, equal to the difference
between the purchase price A0, inflated at the safe rate of return to date D, and the sale price at
                                                
2 Here and throughout this paper we treat the interest rate and capital income tax rate as constant.  If they vary over

































date s, discounted at the safe rate of return back to date D.  We accumulate this date-D liability to
date s at the after-tax interest rate
3:
(5)
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Second, we compute tax at rate t on all the imputed interest on the assumed accumulation from
A0 at date 0 to 
) 0 (
0 ) 1 (
D i A
- - +  at date D, plus all the imputed interest on the assumed
accumulation from 
) ( ) 1 (
D s
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- - +  at date D to As at date s, and carry these liabilities forward at
the after-tax interest rate to date s:
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Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this tax scheme, for an asset that
appreciates from date 0 to date s following the path shown by the thick line.  The scheme uses
only the initial and final asset values, A0 and As, to generate two hypothetical projections of the
asset value at date D, each based on the interest rate, i (see expression (5)).  The difference
between these hypothetical values is taxed at rate g, and the interest assumed to be earned until
date D and after date D along the two hypothetical appreciation paths is taxed at rate t, with all
tax liabilities determined at date s and accumulated to that date.
                                                
3 We explicitly include the date-0 index in exponents for the sake of clarity (the derivation not depending on the




Figure 1. Bradford’s Tax Scheme
In relation to current tax rules, one may think of the second term in (7) as a reduction in
tax liability reflecting the initial “basis” of the asset.  In his original presentation, Bradford shows
that the system in (7) leaves undistorted the realization decision for an asset on which the
investor expects to earn the safe rate of return.  He also notes that, for D = g = 0, the system
reduces to that outlined by Auerbach, given in (4) above.
Bradford’s presentation envisions that all tax consequences are concentrated at the date of
realization, s.  In particular, it is necessary when applying (7) to take into account the asset’s
initial purchase price, A0.  Thus, the system would appear to impose greater informational
requirements than that outlined by Auerbach.  However, it is clear from inspection of (7) that the
same economic impact would result from imposing separate taxes on the two cash flows
associated with the project at their respective dates, A0 at date 0 and As at date s.  That is, one9
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 at date s.
The advantage in imposing the tax separately with respect to each cash flow is that each
one may then be treated without reference to the other.  It follows intuitively that, just as in
Auerbach’s system, the tax system would continue to work with intermediate cash flows, with
each flow being subject to the same tax formula as the initial and final cash flows.  Indeed, this is
shown in Appendix A, following the proof given in Auerbach (1991).
We refer to this modified version of Bradford’s approach, taxing each date-v cash flow
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flow taxation.  Like cash flow taxation, it imposes a tax on each cash flow without reference to
the asset’s value or cash flows at other dates.  Unlike a standard cash flow tax, though, which
would result at rate g by setting the income tax rate t = 0, the generalized cash flow tax
effectively imposes a tax at rate t on accruing capital income.
Given that the tax liability at date s depends only on the same information set as
Auerbach’s system, one may be led to question Auerbach’s proof of uniqueness for his approach.
Note, though, that the tax liability associated with the asset sale under the modified cash flow tax
is not zero for a realization at date 0, as assumed in Auerbach’s proof of uniqueness.  Rather,10
there may be a positive (or negative) tax on sale proceeds, even for an asset sold at the same time
as it is purchased.  For example, if the gain recognition date D = 0, then a sale at date 0 generates
a tax liability of gA0.  Note, though, that a purchase at the same date would generate a deduction
of A0 at rate g, resulting in a net tax liability of zero.  The result is identical to Auerbach’s in this
case, in which the asset is purchased and sold at the same time.  However, the net tax liability
would not necessarily equal zero if the taxpayer acquired the asset by means other than a market
purchase, a distinction that will prove important.
Relaxing the restriction of a zero-tax liability at date 0, the system of generalized cash
flow taxation just described is unique, given its informational requirements.  This, too, is shown
in Appendix A.
B. Commentary
i.  Intuition of the result
It is well known that the “zero” tax on a zero net present value investment that is
characteristic of the conventional cash flow tax fails when the tax rate applied is varying over
time.  A declining cash flow tax rate has the effect of encouraging current deductible investment,
while a rising tax rate discourages it.  A tax rate rising at just the right rate in a conventional cash
flow tax will reproduce the effect of an accrual income tax as far as the incentives of the investor
are concerned.  Specifically, if the fraction of a cash flow that the investor gets to keep (or has to
give up, in the case of an outflow) is falling at a rate equal to some fraction of the interest rate,
then the tax has the same impact as an income tax at that same fractional rate.
To spell this out, note that, with an income tax, an investment of 1 today would generate
1(1) ti +-  in a year.  With a cash flow tax at rate  v f  at the current date v, one could invest11
1
1 v f -
, taking into account the rebate due to the cash flow tax.  A return at interest rate i implies
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 which is to say, it acts to simulate an accrual tax at rate t.
ii. Portfolios and other combinations of assets
Because the generalized cash flow tax may be applied to any asset, regardless of its cash
flows, its properties are preserved if it is imposed on any combination of assets, as long as the
same tax parameters (i, t, D, and g) apply.  That is, if we choose two assets in an investor’s
portfolio and apply the same generalized cash flow tax to each, the outcome is identical to
aggregating the two assets and then applying the generalized cash flow tax with the same
parameters to the combined cash flows of the two assets.  Similarly, should the investor break a
single asset into pieces, this will have no tax consequences.  This invariance leads to an
important conclusion: the system not only imposes an income tax rate t on the returns to any
particular investment, but will do so regardless of how the investment is characterized by the
investor or, indeed, even whether the investment’s existence is acknowledged.
Example 1: Consider the well-known equivalence between an equity position combined with a
put option and a call option at the same strike price, and a safe zero-coupon bond with a single12
payment equal to that strike price.  Under current law, these two equivalent positions face
different tax treatment; the bond would be taxed over time subject to the original issue discount
rules, while the equity and options would not.  However, under a generalized cash flow tax, the
combined cash flows of these two positions would be identical and so, therefore, would be their
pattern of tax payments.
Example 2: One thorny problem under current tax rules is when to combine two sides of a
hedging transaction.  If one asset is a mirror image of another, logic and practice suggest that
they should be combined for tax purposes to avoid a pure arbitrage transaction.  But what if one
position hedges a combination of several other positions, no one of which is a close match to the
first position by itself.  Such “portfolio” hedging is typically ignored by tax rules, but offers the
same arbitrage potential as the simple hedge.  Yet both sets of positions would be automatically
merged under generalized cash flow taxation, without any action required on the part of tax
authorities.
Example 3: Some assets may not even be identifiable until they begin generating cash flows.
This may be especially the case for closely-held assets.  We take up below the extension of the
generalized cash flow tax beyond arms length financial assets.  The flavor of that extension is
suggested by the example of a firm or individual possessing the knowledge required to develop a
certain technology.  This knowledge has value, and the value of this asset will change over time.
Generalized cash flow taxation will effectively impose an income tax on these changes in value,
through its anticipated impact on future cash flows.  This implicit taxation of accruing gains will
also make the tax system neutral with respect to the investor’s decision regarding when to
“reveal” the asset’s existence by implementing the associated technology in production.13
iii. Treatment of gains and losses
The Auerbach rule results in what, at first sight, may seem to be an odd treatment of
gains and losses, to wit, a gain, in itself, gives rise to no extra tax and a loss to no reduction in
tax.  The sale value of the asset with no intermediate distributions is, in effect, treated as the
result of accumulation at the safe interest rate since the date of acquisition.  No extra tax is due
if, in fact, the asset has jumped in value since that date; no allowance is given if, in fact, the asset
has lost value.  As emphasized by both Auerbach and Bradford , there is nothing wrong with this
feature of the rule applied to transactions at arm’s length in an efficient capital market that, in
effect, permits costless construction of all zero-value “bets.”  Gains or losses relative to
accumulation at the risk-free interest rate are the results of good or bad outcomes of such bets.
Any rate of tax applied to a bet has the effect of reducing its scale but not its essential stochastic
character.  (This statement will not hold if the tax depends on the size of the gain or loss, as it
may in a graduated-rate system.)  As a result, any tax applied to bets can be completely offset, at
the discretion of the investor/gambler, simply by changing the scale of a zero-value bet in the
financial markets.
As described in the exposition of the concept, the generalized cash flow tax has the effect
of subjecting to tax, at rate g, gains and losses, relative to the risk-free results, all brought by
appropriate back or forward discounting to gains realization date, D.  We suggest below that this
feature of the generalized cash flow rule may have a useful practical role to play.  As long as we
are dealing with arm’s length transactions in a dense capital market, however, the investor is
theoretically indifferent to the gain tax, since it can be completely offset with zero-value bets.14
iv. Choice of parameters, g and D
The original Bradford scheme conceived of setting (perhaps by free choice of the
investor) the “capital gain” parameters, g and D, that would apply to each asset in isolation; D
was described as a time since the acquisition date of the asset.  So long as there is no ambiguity
about the identity of an asset (so that, in particular, its acquisition date is well defined), it is
conceptually permissible for each asset to have its own values of g and D.  As has been
suggested above, the identity of assets in this sense is, however, problematic when one takes into
account transactions such as mergers and sale of some rights pertaining to an asset.  These
problems vanish when the same values of g and D apply to all assets, where D now has the
interpretation of a particular calendar date, rather than a time since acquisition.
Conceivably, one could specify such common values to apply to all investors at all times.
The implication would be a rate of taxation of gains and losses that tends over time toward 100
per cent.  As a theoretical matter, to repeat, this is no problem, so long as we confine our
attention to the investment choices, where only intertemporal and risk allocations are involved.
If investors want to take a particular risk position, they can do so, independently of the tax
applicable to gains and losses, by taking appropriate zero-value hedging positions.  As a practical
matter, however, one can imagine some problems with an investor getting a tax rebate of 99.9
percent of the amount invested, and paying 99.93 percent on the return flow in a few years’ time.
A way around this practical problem would be to specify separate pairs of values of g and
D for each taxpayer.  (Throughout we assume taxpayers are natural people, not companies.)
Suppose, for example, D were chosen to be, alternatively, the taxpayer’s 40
th or 120
th birthday.
Table 1 displays the tax rates that would apply at various ages for various choices of gains tax
rates, g, assuming a risk-free interest rate of 2 percent and capital income tax rate of 25 percent.15
All of these age-tax rate structures are identical in their effect on intertemporal choice.  In
particular, applied to any given portfolio they generate the same value of tax revenue, discounted
at the after tax rate of return.  The age-tax rate structure implicit in the Auerbach gains tax rate of
zero is shown in the first column of each panel.
D=40 D=120
g g
Age 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
20 -10.3 0.7 11.7 22.8 33.8 44.8 55.9 -63.5 -47.1 -30.8 -14.4 1.9 18.3 34.6
40 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 -48.2 -33.3 -18.5 -3.7 11.1 25.9 40.7
60 9.4 18.4 27.5 36.6 45.6 54.7 63.7 -34.3 -20.9 -7.4 6.0 19.4 32.9 46.3
80 17.8 26.1 34.3 42.5 50.7 58.9 67.1 -21.7 -9.5 2.6 14.8 27.0 39.1 51.3
Assumes interest rate (i) of 2 percent and capital income tax rate (t) of 25 percent.
Table 1. Generalized Cash Flow Tax Rates (in percent) at Various Ages for Gains Date, D,
Equals 40 or 120 and Various Gains Tax Rates, g
v. Gifts and bequests
Where the tax parameters are specific to the taxpayer a new issue arises: the treatment of
transfers between taxpayers.  Important examples would include transfers between spouses and
between parents and children.  The subject of interspousal transfers would take us on too long an
excursion into the treatment of married versus unmarried couples for adequate discussion here.
With respect to the treatment of intergenerational transfers, the discussion in the U.S. Treasury’s
Blueprints for Tax Reform (Bradford et al., 1984; hereinafter Blueprints) of the same problem in
the framework of that study’s Cash Flow Tax may be relevant.16
The Blueprints Cash Flow Tax was conceived of as imposing a burden of tax in
proportion to the discounted value of a person’s lifetime consumption.
4  One way to think about
the intergenerational transfer issue (or, more broadly, the treatment of gratuitous transfers) is
whether amounts given away should be thought of as “consumed” by the giver, or not.  There
seems to be no particularly compelling a priori theoretical answer to this question.  Blueprints
came down on the side of excluding the amount given away from the consumption of the giver
and including it in the tax base of the recipient.  This approach has an administrative advantage
in that in the typical case (in which the asset is not disposed of) there are no tax consequences at
the time of transfer of an asset.
5
The generalized cash flow tax is a combination of a consumption (“labor income”) tax
and a capital income tax.  A positive rate of capital income tax implies a policy concern with the
timing of consumption that might be expressed by the objective of imposing the same discounted
burden on two people with the same discounted consumption stream, with discounting done at
the after-capital income tax interest rate (so postponing consumption is penalized).  (In the
regular cash flow tax the capital income tax rate is zero, so the pre- and post-tax interest rates are
the same.)  Capturing the capital income piece appears to require that the g and D associated with
the acquisition of an asset stick with the asset until its disposition, which would present no
problem in the “universal D” case but would pose administrative challenges in the system
involving a separate D for each individual.  In this world it would probably be necessary to treat
a gift or bequest as a realization event for the transferor (presumably with no deduction by the
                                                
4 The Blueprints plan implemented a graduated tax schedule with respect to discounted lifetime consumption.  If all
cash flows were subject to it (see the discussion below), the generalized cash flow tax with capital tax rate, t, equal
to zero would impose a tax at the single rate, g, on lifetime consumption.
5 We can think of such a transfer as involving an implicit sale, taxed to the transferor, a gift, deducted by the
transferor, taxable receipt by the transferee, and deductible saving by the transferee.17
transferor and no inclusion of amounts received in the tax base of the transferee).  This
requirement would present an arguably minor breech in the strict cash flow accounting involved
in the scheme.
vi. Enforcement
Both the Auerbach and Bradford concepts were motivated by interest in the possibility of
taxing consistently the yield from assets that could and could not be readily marked to market.
The former yields were assumed taxed on an accrual basis, whereas taxation of the latter must
inevitably be on what Warren (1993) calls a “wait and see” basis.  The presumption was that
some assets are taxed on an accrual basis, which translates in the models as a tax on the basis of
the observed interest rate.  The alternative modified taxation of realized cash amounts, developed
here as generalized cash flow taxation, was thought of as the treatment that would hypothetically
be imposed on assets for which accrual taxation was impractical, much as realization accounting
is done in the existing income tax.
Our current analysis has emphasized an additional benefit to generalized cash flow
taxation that obtains from subjecting all investment or capital income cash flows to the same tax
system, namely elimination of the opportunity to take advantage of differences in tax treatment.
However, if the new tax system is to be applied only on a limited basis, this raises the question of
how one distinguishes the cash flows to which the modified cash flow tax applies from those
associated with transactions subject to accrual accounting.
One possibility would be to use a device analogous to the Qualified Accounts suggested
in the Blueprints Cash Flow Tax.  In the Blueprints Cash Flow Tax, in which a zero rate of tax
on capital income is the objective, the default treatment of financial flows involving arm’s length
assets is to ignore them.  Net flows from a Qualified Account are, by contrast, included in the18
Cash Flow Tax base (so net deposits are deducted).  In the context of the generalized cash flow
tax on capital income, the default would be to subject all “capital income associated” cash flows
to the proposed time-varying rates, with deduction in the case of negative flows.
6  A taxpayer
that wanted to elect the present style treatment of capital income would have access to a “Tax
Anticipation Account.”  Net flows from a Tax Anticipation Account, limited to assets traded on
active security markets, would, by contrast, be excluded from the generalized cash flow tax base.
That means the investor would get no deduction for a deposit and pay no tax on a withdrawal.
Instead, the Tax Anticipation Account would be subjected to tax on a mark-to-market basis at the
appropriate capital income tax rate.
It is important to stress here that the choice of assets eligible for the Tax Anticipation
Account must be limited to assets held at arm’s length; otherwise, the taxpayer could arbitrage
the differences in tax treatment by constructing assets with below-market returns to be taxed on
an ex post basis and assets with above-market returns to be taxed on an ex ante basis.
3. Extensions
A. Effective tax rate variation, wealth taxation, and inflation adjustment
i.  Effective tax rate variation and wealth taxation
Our derivation of the generalized cash flow tax shows how it is possible to duplicate in
essential economic effects a capital income tax imposed at some specified rate on accruing
income.  Still assuming we can meaningfully identify cash flows associated with “capital
                                                
6 At this point we are assuming individual investment flows are distinguishable from “labor income” flows; we take
up below the problem of making such distinctions.19
income,” it would, furthermore, be possible by the same general approach to duplicate a time-
varying capital income tax rate.  (We omit the details.)
By subjecting all capital income cash flows to the generalized cash flow tax (so there is
no alternative tax treatment, such as accrual accounting), one could impose any desired capital
income tax, unconstrained by the arbitrage conditions underlying the treatment of timing that
motivated the Vickrey conditions.  Think of the generalized cash flow tax rate as obeying
1(1),
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 where i and t have the standard interpretations, we produce the effect of an
accrual tax at rate t on the actual interest rate, i.  But we could choose the parameter g  directly.





= .  One may also view the result as equivalent to a uniform wealth tax (at the
beginning of the period) at rate  ) 1 ( g - .  Note that, under this inclusive approach, it is not even
necessary to observe the risk-free interest rate to impose a tax system that imposes the same
effective rate of tax on all capital income.  Only the parameter g  need be specified, although the
effective rate of capital income tax will depend on the actual value of the interest rate.
The requirement that all capital income cash flows be covered is important.  If the
taxpayer had the alternative of electing accrual income taxation of capital income, there would
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<  the taxpayer could borrow under the regular tax system and lend
under the new regime, thereby setting up a (present value) tax gain.  Barring constraints such as
the present law’s limit on the deductibility of interest, the result would be a “money machine,” an
unlimited tax arbitrage opportunity.
7
ii. Inflation adjustment
As emphasized by Bradford (1997), the capital income tax effected by the generalized
cash flow tax is certainly not “correct” if taxation of real capital income is the objective.  With a
positive rate of inflation, taxing nominal interest income at a constant rate would imply taxing
real interest income at a higher, perhaps time-varying rate.  The previous discussion relating to
wealth taxation indicates that it would be conceptually easy to use the generalized cash flow tax
to impose an inflation-corrected capital income tax:  if i
* is the real interest rate, then one would
substitute i
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 the generalized cash flow tax formula.  If not
all capital income were subject to the generalized cash flow tax regime, we would need to correct
for inflation the accrual income tax rules applicable to the alternative forms of investment, e.g.,
income within a Tax Anticipation Account.
B. Closely-held assets and human capital accumulation
As discussed in Auerbach (1991), the original approach to retrospective taxation of
individual assets encounters problems when assets are closely held; in particular, the system
yields the wrong result when investors can misrepresent the return stream and cost associated
with an particular asset.  As already discussed here, this problem is overcome to the extent that
                                                
7 Bradford (1997) emphasizes the importance of avoiding such restrictions, which he refers to as nonlinearities of
income measurement.21
alternative assets are also included under the proposed tax regime, for then the tax calculation
aggregates all cash flows, regardless of the asset with which they are associated by the investor.
But a key borderline remains between labor and capital income.
If an investor has the choice of purchasing an asset or constructing it himself through his
own effort (think of a venture capital operation), the choice should not be distorted by taxation.
Yet, if the proposed system applies only to capital income, a distortion will exist.  Under the
original retrospective tax scheme, for example, the individual would avoid tax on the imputed
labor income by opting for the self-constructed asset, but would be taxable on that labor income
if it were used to finance the asset’s market purchase.  Even under the scheme presented here, the
potential distortion will remain, except in one case.  If the labor income tax at each date equals
the generalized cash flow tax at that date, the investor’s decision to report imputed labor income
would have no tax consequences, the extra tax being exactly offset by the extra cash flow
deduction associated with the asset purchase.
There are two possible policy responses to this result.  On the one hand, one might
conclude that taxing labor income at rates rising over time is undesirable and that the inclusion of
labor income under the generalized cash flow system is unnecessary.  On the other hand, there
are interesting additional properties associated with such a rising labor income tax schedule.
First, it would eliminate the relative tax benefit given human capital (or other) investment
that is financed with foregone earnings when labor income tax rates are constant over time.  To
see this intuitively, note that such investment receives its favorable treatment because imputed
labor income that is foregone when such an investment occurs is not subject to taxation.  If
individuals were forced to report such imputed income and receive basis in the capital
investment, the tax advantage would go away (assuming economic depreciation for all22
investments).  However, the proposed inclusion of labor income under the generalized cash flow
tax would eliminate the net tax consequences of deciding to report such imputed income and an
asset purchase of equal size.  Hence, it follows that human capital investment would be treated
no better or worse than other investments, a point made in a related context by Kaplow (1996).
Indeed, this effect of rising labor income taxes over time has been submitted as a defense
of the Nordic approach to dual income taxation, which imposes a proportional tax on capital
income but a progressive tax (typically with rising marginal tax rates over the productive part of
the life cycle) on labor income (Nielsen and Sørensen 1997).  It is also true that, relative to a
world in which labor income tax rates are constant over time, such a system alters the
intertemporal trade-off between leisure at different dates, discouraging leisure early in life
relative to late in life, when tax rates are higher.
In fact, relative to the usual income tax world, such a system will exactly offset the
intertemporal leisure distortion.  As shown in Appendix B, the household’s intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution for leisure under this regime will be based on the before-tax interest
rate, as would be true in the absence of taxation.  There is no reason to assume, of course, that a
zero intertemporal labor distortion is optimal in this second-best world in which the
intertemporal consumption and labor-leisure distortions remain.  However, considering the
optimality of intertemporal labor taxation begs the question of how the income tax rate t is
determined in the first place.  This is certainly an issue worth addressing, but it lies beyond the
scope of this paper.
 C. Lifetime progressivity and income averaging
Once the capital income tax rate has been set, the properties of the tax on earnings at
different ages are determined by the “g and D” combinations.23
Table 1 gives a sense for the pattern of tax rates at various ages that is implied by typical
choices.  Although the tax rates vary over the life cycle, they should be thought of as analogous
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 corresponding to capital income tax rate, t.  A natural question is whether one
could, alternatively, apply some sort of graduated rate structure to cash flows in order to achieve
progressivity in the system.  The difficulty is that, if earnings or cash flows are not uniform over
time, a graduated rate structure will generate intertemporal variation in the rates that will upset
the uniform capital income taxation aimed for by the system.
A similar problem confronted the Blueprints Cash Flow Tax.  In that case, where a zero
rate of capital income taxation was an objective, the aim was to assure that a taxpayer would
always confront the same marginal rate on cash flows, thereby eliminating the inefficiency that
would result from a time-varying rate of tax and effecting a tax burden based on an arguably
appropriate average of lifetime consumption.  Because of variation in consumption over time
(and the fact that some assets, notably owner-occupied houses, were excluded from the system),
this would be an unlikely result if a graduated rate structure were strictly applied to all cash
flows.  Instead, under the Blueprints cash flow tax, the taxpayer is given the option to choose
between two forms of accounting for cash flows associated with arm’s length investing.  Net
deposits to a Qualified Account are deducted from the tax base; other "nonqualified" investment
and disinvestment transactions in arm’s length financial assets are ignored by the system.  A
nonqualified investment sacrifices the benefit of deduction for up-front outflows from the
taxpayer, but the return is free of tax.24
Under this approach, a taxpayer anticipating a rising cash flow tax rate would find it
advantageous to remove funds from Qualified Accounts (adding to the current tax base, thereby
inducing a higher current marginal tax rate) and invest them in nonqualified form (reducing the
future tax base, thereby inducing a lower future marginal tax rate).  Such a transaction would add
to the current tax base and reduce the future tax base by the same amount in present value.  The
result would be a reduction in the discounted lifetime tax flow (because the marginal tax rate is
lower in the present than in the future).  Continuing this process, the taxpayer would seek to
maintain a constant anticipated marginal tax rate.  For taxpayers with higher lifetime inflows, for
example owing to high labor earnings, the marginal tax rate that would result from such
(desirable) tax planning would be higher than for taxpayers with lower lifetime inflows.
In the framework of the generalized cash flow tax, the Tax Anticipation Account could
be deployed to similar effect.  The generalized cash flow tax rate would be treated as the default
rate applicable to cash flows in general.  Net deposits to the Tax Anticipation Account, which
would be subject to accrual income taxation, would be excluded from the generalized cash flow
tax base.  The default tax would be determined by applying to the included cash flows a
graduated rate structure, derived from a conventional graduated rate structure by making it age
dependent in such a way that the marginal net of tax rate at each tax base level declines at the
after-tax interest rate.
To illustrate, suppose we wanted the lifetime tax rate to be that characterizing D=120 and
g=.3 in Table 1 for a low-wage worker, that characterizing D=120 and g=.4 in Table 1 for a
medium earner and D=120 and g=.5 in Table 1 for a higher earner.  The uniform level of
consumption that could be sustained by a worker in the first category, using standard smoothing
transactions (subject to the uniform capital income tax would be), let us say, less than $30,000.25
The corresponding figure for the middle earner would be between $30,000 and $90,000; for the
high earner, over $90,000.  Table 2 shows the graduated schedule of tax rates that would apply to





20 -14.4 1.9 18.3
40 -3.7 11.1 25.9
60 6.0 19.4 32.9
80 14.8 27.0 39.1
Table 2. Graduated Generalized Cash Flow Tax Rates (percent)
Analogously to the Blueprints cash flow tax regime, the taxpayer anticipating lifetime
annuity-equivalent (at the after-capital income tax interest rate) consumption of more than
$30,000 and less than $90,000 would want to manage flows into and out of the Tax Anticipation
Account so as to maintain a taxable generalized cash flow tax base in every period of at least
$30,000.  If the taxpayer’s “taxable income” so defined were to drop below $30,000 in a period
the taxpayer would forgo the advantage of the lower marginal rates on the shortfall.  In the
$30,000-$90,000 range the marginal net of tax rate falls at the net of capital income tax interest
rate.  This corresponds to the capital income tax penalty on assets in the Tax Anticipation
Account.  (If taxable income were subject to a continuously graduated schedule, the taxpayer
would have an incentive to maintain an exactly constant level of taxable income.)
A potential complication of this approach to individual averaging is that it depends on the
taxpayer’s ability to allocate assets across the two types of accounts.  As stressed above, this
opens up the possibility of dysfunctional tax arbitrage unless the taxpayer’s allocation decision is26
constrained to assets held at arm’s length.  But successful averaging does not require that the
taxpayer be given full flexibility with respect to arm’s length assets.  For example, it could be
accommodated even if the taxpayer’s choice were restricted to government bonds specially
created for this purpose.  The government could permit each individual to establish a pair of
special government bond accounts, the balances of which would be updated on the taxpayer’s
annual tax return.  One account would be subject to generalized cash flow taxation, the other to
accrual taxation.   The two accounts would carry the same rate of interest, and the balance in
either could be negative, as long as the net balance of the two accounts remained non-negative.
By borrowing in one account and depositing an equal amount in the other, the taxpayer would be
able to decelerate or accelerate lifetime cash flows to ensure adequate lifetime averaging.  But,
because the two accounts would impose the same effective tax rates under successful averaging,
there would be no scope for arbitrage beyond that used to accomplish the averaging.
One subtle point to recognize about this approach to averaging (whether under the
Blueprints Cash Flow Tax or the generalized version) is that it would not generally leave the
investor in a situation in which the risk-adjusted before-tax return to investment equals the
interest rate, i.e.,  i r V s = ) ( .  Even with averaging, future tax rates would still be uncertain.  As a
consequence, the taxpayer’s portfolio decisions would depend not simply on the expected tax
rate, but also on the covariance between the tax rate and each asset’s before-tax returns.  For
example, an asset offering higher returns when the tax rate is higher (as would be the case if
higher than expected asset returns are associated with a higher standard of living) would serve as
a hedge against tax rate variation, leading the investor to accept a lower before-tax return than if
the asset’s before-tax returns were independent of tax rate variation.27
Is this incentive to offset tax-rate risk a cause of inefficiency?  It may seem so, in that it
distorts taxpayer behavior in response to individual risks that are socially diversifiable.  On the
other hand, even risks that could in principle be diversified need to be taken into account if no
mechanism actually exists for such diversification.  Once tax-rate risk has been introduced, it is
privately and socially optimal for taxpayers to offset the risk unless there is some other
mechanism that allows them to do so, i.e., to pool tax-rate risk with other taxpayers.
4. Conclusion
We have shown in this paper the unique form that must be taken by a tax system based
entirely on realization accounting to implement a uniform capital income tax, or, equivalently, a
uniform wealth tax.  We have also shown how such a tax can be supplemented with an optional
accounting for a segregated subset of actively traded securities, subjected separately to mark-to-
market taxation at the uniform capital income tax rate, to permit a fully graduated tax system
applicable to labor income.
One may view this paper’s contribution as extending the relationship between the
standard cash flow tax and a zero accrual tax on capital income.  As in this previously analyzed
case, the effective tax burden on marginal capital income is the same under the alternative tax
regimes – the generalized cash flow tax and the accrual tax – but the timing of tax collections
and the burden on inframarginal rents differ.
Our presentation has eschewed a rehearsal of the familiar arguments whether a system
that taxes capital income should be regarded as desirable policy option.  In a sense, though, it
may help narrow the terms of the debate, for it illustrates that one may determine separately
whether to implement cash flow taxation and whether to impose a marginal tax rate on capital
income.  This narrowing of the debate casts an interesting light on the question of whether28
capital income taxes are desirable.  On the one hand, implementation of a system of uniform
capital income taxation is more feasible than was thought.  On the other hand, the imposition of a
positive capital income tax rate, conditional on having adopted the generalized cash flow tax,
seems all the more arbitrary.
We have also deferred consideration of transition from an ideal or actual income tax to
the generalized cash flow tax regime, which would raise many of the same issues as the
transition to a traditional cash flow tax, plus others as well.29
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Appendix A. Basic Propositions
This appendix proves several propositions referred to in the text.  These propositions and
their proofs follow those in Auerbach (1991) for the more general tax scheme discussed here, of
which Auerbach’s is a special case.
Proposition 1: Condition (2) in the text is necessary and sufficient for the achievement of
holding-period neutrality for the class of assets with no intermediate distributions.
proof:  At any date s, the net value of an asset to the investor is the value of the asset less the
accumulated tax liability.  To continue to hold the asset for another period, the investor requires a
certainty-equivalent return equal to the after-tax interest rate i(1-t).  Thus, in equilibrium,
(A1) )) 1 ( 1 )( ( ) ( 1 1 t i T A T A V s s s s - + - = - + +
Combined with equation (2), (A1) implies that  s s A i A V ) 1 ( ) ( 1 + = + , regardless of As or s.  Hence,
(2) implies holding-period neutrality.  Combined with the requirement that  s s A i A V ) 1 ( ) ( 1 + = +  for
holding-period neutrality, (A1) implies (2).  ￿
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is the only one based on the information set (t, i, s, As) that satisfies the condition for holding-
period neutrality, given as expression (2) in the text.31
proof: Consider a tax rule based on the admissible information set:
(A3) ) , , , ( s s A s i t F T = .
Since the division of assets is arbitrary, there must exist some function f(·) such that
(A4) s s A s t i f A s i t F ) , , ( ) , , , ( = .
Using (A4), we may express the tax at date s+1 as:
(A5) s s s s A r s t i f A s t i f T ) 1 )( 1 , , ( ) 1 , , ( 1 1 + + = + = + +
If F(·) is holding-period neutral, then it will be true that V(rs) = i, so (A5) implies that
(A6) s s A i s t i f T V ) 1 )( 1 , , ( ) ( 1 + + = +
By expression (2) in the text, which is assumed to hold, we also have:
(A7) s s s s s tiA A s i t f t i tiA T t i T V + - + = + - + = + ) , , ( )] 1 ( 1 [ )] 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 1
Combination of expressions (A6) and (A7) produces the first-order difference equation,
(A8) ti s i t f t i i s i t f + - + = + + ) , , ( )) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 , , (
for which the general solution is:
(A9) ) 0 , , (
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For f(t,i,0) = 0, (A9) yields the discrete-time version of the system in Auerbach (1991).  For
,
1
) 1 ( 1





















g i t f  the result in (A2) obtains.  Because the choices of g and
D are arbitrary and can be set to produce any value of f(t,i,0), the system in (A2) is unique.
Indeed, there are an infinite number of ways to impose the same tax system by varying the
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Proposition 3: For an asset with intermediate tax payments, ts, and intermediate distributions, ds,
the following condition is necessary and sufficient for a tax to be holding-period neutral:
(A10) s s s s tiA T t i T V t - + - + = + )] 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 1
proof:  We follow the proof to Proposition 1 above.  In portfolio equilibrium it must be true that
(A11) )) 1 ( 1 )( ( ) ( 1 1 t i T A d T A V s s s s s s - + - = - + - + + t
Combined with equation (A10), (A11) implies that  s s A i A V ) 1 ( ) ( 1 + = + , regardless of As or s.
Hence, (A10) implies holding-period neutrality.  Combined with the requirement that
s s A i A V ) 1 ( ) ( 1 + = +  for holding-period neutrality, (A11) implies (A10).  ￿
Proposition 4: For an asset with intermediate distributions at the end of period s, ds, a tax regime
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satisfies condition (A10) and hence is holding-period neutral.
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which, after some algebra, may be rewritten (using the analogous definition of Ts) as:
(A14)
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where the second line of (A14) uses expression (A12) to substitute for ds.  However, for a tax
system that is holding-period neutral, it will turn out that the certainty-equivalent value of the
before-tax return equals the interest rate, e.g.,  s s s s iA d A r V = + ) ( .  Substituting this into (A14),
after applying V(￿) to both sides, yields expression (A10).  ￿
Appendix B. Intertemporal Optimization and Leisure
This appendix demonstrates the proposition stated in the text, that including labor income
under the generalized cash flow tax eliminates the intertemporal leisure distortion.
We start with the optimization problem of a household facing uncertain asset returns.  At
time v, the household seeks to maximize the expected utility of lifetime consumption (c) and
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where Ev(·) is the expectation based on the information set at time v.  The household’s budget
constraint may be expressed in terms of the evolution of the amount of wealth it has available for
consumption each period, say Ws.  At date s, this equals the value of the household’s risky (As)
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) 1 ( 1 q  is the tax rate at date s.  The amount
available after waiting a period takes into account asset returns, the change in the tax rate, and
after-tax labor earnings net of consumption (which we assume occur at the end of the period), or
(B2) s s s s s s s s c l w i B r A W - - - + - + + + = + + + ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )]( 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1 1 1 q q
where a unit labor endowment is assumed and w is the wage rate, assumed for simplicity to be
constant over time.  Using the definitions of W and q, we may rewrite (B2) as:
(B3) s s s s s s s s c l w A i r W t i W - - - + - - + - + = + + + ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )] 1 ( 1 [ 1 1 1 q q .
The household’s problem consists of maximizing the expression in (B1) subject to (B3) and to
the condition that terminal wealth be non-negative.  Expressing this problem using Bellman’s
equation, we have:
(B4) { } ) ( ) , ( max ) ( 1 1 , , + + + = s s s s s s A l c s s W V E l c U W V
s s s
where the state variable Ws+1 is determined by (B3).35
Based on (B4), the first-order conditions with respect to As, cs, ls, and Ws may be written:
(B5a) ( ) 1 + ¢ = s s sc V E U (B5b) ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 + + - ¢ = s s s sl w V E U q
(B5c) ( ) [ ] 0 1 = - ¢ + i r V E s s s (B5d) ( )[ ] ) 1 ( 1 1 t i V E V s s s - + ¢ = ¢ +
where  s s sc c U U ¶ ¶ = /  and  s s sl l U U ¶ ¶ = /  are the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure at
date s, and  s V¢ is the marginal value of wealth at date s.   For simplicity, we have assumed that
future tax rates are known and that future wage and interest rates are constant.
Expression (B5a) is the condition that the marginal utility of consumption equals the
marginal value of wealth, and (B5b) is the analogous condition for leisure.  Expression (B5c) is
simply the condition, proved above, that the valuation of the risky asset’s return be the risk-free
rate.  Expression (B5d) says that the marginal value of wealth is expected to fall over time at the
after-tax interest rate, i(1-t).  Substituting this expression into (B5a) for successive periods gives
the standard result that the marginal utility of consumption is expected to fall over time at the
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That is, the household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for leisure is based on the
before-tax interest rate, as would be true in the absence of taxation.  It is clear from the second
line of (B6) that this result hinges on labor’s tax rate changing over time.  Were the tax on labor
income fixed, the resulting marginal rate of substitution would be based on i(1-t) rather than i.